Objectives: The emergence of community-associated methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (CA-MRSA) has changed the epidemiology of MRSA infections worldwide. In contrast to hospital-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA), CA-MRSA more frequently affects healthy individuals, both with and without recent healthcare exposure. Despite obvious epidemiological differences, it is unknown whether differences in nosocomial transmissibility exist. We have, therefore, quantified the transmissibility, expressed by the single admission reproduction number (R A ), of CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA in hospital settings in Denmark.
Introduction
Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) is an important nosocomial pathogen and MRSA infections have been associated with excess morbidity and mortality. 1, 2 Until 2000, MRSA was mainly confined to healthcare settings, but the emergence of community-associated MRSA (CA-MRSA) has changed the global epidemiology of MRSA infections. 3 -5 While so-called hospital-associated MRSA (HA-MRSA) typically cause infections in hospitalized and frequently debilitated patients, CA-MRSA typically infect healthy individuals without previous healthcare contact. In recent years, though, CA-MRSA have become increasingly prevalent in hospital settings, especially in the USA. 6 The rapid dissemination of MRSA strain USA300 in hospitals in the USA combined with the high attack rate during outbreaks suggests that this strain has a higher transmission capacity than HA-MRSA strains. 3 In contrast to USA300, the nosocomial transmission of livestock-associated MRSA (ST398; where ST stands for sequence type) was less likely than that of traditional HA-MRSA strains in Dutch hospitals. 7 Our understanding of the transmissibility of different MRSA genotypes, other than livestock-associated CA-MRSA in Dutch hospitals, remains largely incomplete. We, therefore, aimed to quantify the variability in the nosocomial transmissibility of CA-MRSA by calculating the single admission reproduction number (R A ) using a mathematical model based on queuing theory. 
Index patients
Clinical and demographical data from patients colonized or infected with MRSA between January 2003 and April 2010 were extracted from the laboratory information system of the Department of Clinical Microbiology of Hvidovre Hospital and Herlev Hospital, the patient administration system (Grønt System) and the Danish Civil Registration System, which tracks daily changes in vital status, including change of address, date of emigration and date of death, for the entire Danish population. 8 Age, gender, location of first isolation sample site, hospital ward of index case, total length of hospital stay and number of hospital days until isolation were extracted.
Search for secondary MRSA cases
The Danish national MRSA guidelines have been in place since 2006. 9 Between 2003 and 2006 a precursor of the national guidelines was used, which was based on the practice at Hvidovre Hospital at that time. During the study period the screening policy for MRSA did not change. Hospitalized but non-isolated patients in whom MRSA carriage (or infection) was detected (i.e. an index case) would be isolated and patients sharing the same room would be screened to determine patient-to-patient spread. In the case of documented transmission of MRSA, all other patients in the ward and all ward personnel who had had contact with the MRSA carriers would be screened as well. Patient screening included swab samples from nose, throat and perineum, and from sores, skin infections and, when present, intravenous entry or drainage sites, probes, urine samples (in the case of an indwelling catheter) and tracheal secretions (only in intubated patients). For healthcare workers, screening included swabs from nose, throat and, if present, skin infections. Secondary cases were required to have an identical MRSA genotype to that of the index case. The post-exposure screening results were retrieved and analysed for secondary MRSA cases.
MRSA isolates and typing
Samples were processed according to local protocols, which initially used blood agar and MRSA chromogenic agar and, more recently, semiselective broth enrichment. 10 Antibiotic susceptibility testing for cefoxitin, erythromycin, clindamycin, vancomycin, gentamicin, rifampicin, moxifloxacin, fusidic acid and linezolid was done on all isolates as described elsewhere. 11 All MRSA isolates were confirmed mecA positive by PCR. 12 All isolates of index and secondary cases were spa genotyped as previously described, 13 using the Ridom StaphType program (www.ridom.de) to allocate spa types. The staphylococcal cassette chromosome mec (SCCmec) type and the presence of luk-PV genes, indicative of PantonValentine leucocidin (PVL), were determined by using an in-house multiplex PCR, as described elsewhere. 14, 15 Multilocus sequence typing (MLST) was done as previously described 16 or the type was assigned by using the Spaserver (http://spaserver.ridom.de).
CA-MRSA were defined as belonging to the following genotypes: t008-ST8, PVL+, SCCmec IV (USA300); t019-ST30, PVL+, SCCmec IV (the south-west Pacific clone); t127-ST1, PVL+, SCCmec IV (USA400); or t044-ST80, PVL+, SCCmec IV (the European clone). 17 We considered t068, PVL+, a single-locus variant of t008, to be related to t008. All remaining genotypes were considered HA-MRSA.
Model
We use a previously described mathematical model based on queuing theory 18 to estimate the strain-specific transmission capacity, i.e. the R A value. The basic assumption of this model is that each outbreak is caused by a colonized patient who enters the hospital while all other patients are uncolonized and susceptible. We assume that when an index patient is detected as such, the contact screening will identify all colonized patients who are involved in the outbreak and are still hospitalized. Three rates determine the spread of MRSA in the hospital setting: (i) the rate at which the MRSA strain spreads; (ii) the rate at which the MRSA-colonized patient is detected as such (i.e. microbiological cultures); and (iii) the rate at which a colonized patient can no longer be detected as such.
The model predicts that the distribution of the number of patients colonized at the time of detection of the index case is geometrically distributed. The parameter (j) of the geometric distribution of the detected outbreak sizes was determined by using maximum likelihood estimation. If there are N outbreaks with a total of M secondary cases, the likelihood is given by L¼j
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is given by j MLE¼N/(N+M). The outbreak size alone is insufficient to calculate R A . Small, detected outbreak sizes could correspond to either a low potential of transmission or to a high detection rate.
Patients with MRSA remain colonized during their hospital stay and, therefore, the infectious period ends at the time of discharge. Genotypespecific discharge rates were calculated from the admission and discharge data of index patients admitted to the four Danish hospitals during the study period. The detection rate was based on all blood, respiratory tract and wound cultures done during 2005 in the four participating hospitals. The upper detection limit consists of all these cultures divided by the total number of patient days in 2005. With the ratio between the average detection rate and genotype-specific discharge rate (r), combined with the parameter of geometric distribution j, we can calculate
Statistical analysis
Significance was assessed using two-sided tests for all variables, applying a cut-off value of P¼0.05. CIs were calculated using the profile likelihood method. The Anderson-Darling goodness-of-fit test was used to assess whether the outbreak sizes were geometrically distributed.
Results
During the 7 year period there were 124 MRSA index patients with subsequent post-contact screening among patients and healthcare workers (n¼ 1108) in the four participating hospitals.
Seven index patients were detected through screening cultures: three were screened on hospital admission but not isolated and four patients were screened after a period in which no barrier precautions were taken during hospital admission. These 7 patients were excluded, leaving 117 index patients for further analysis.
Among the 117 index patients, 24 different spa types were identified (see Table 1 ), with t024 ST8 IV (50%) being most frequent, followed by t008 ST8 IV (7%), t019 ST30 IV (5%), t002 ST5 II (4%) and t4866 (4%). SCCmec typing revealed 98 isolates with SCCmec type IV or V (84%). HA-MRSA SCCmec types I, II and III were detected in one, four and two index patients, Hetem et al.
respectively (6% combined). In 12 strains (10%), SCCmec was non-typeable. The luk-PV gene, indicative of PVL, was detected in 16 (14%) of the 117 isolates investigated. Fifteen of these isolates (94%) belonged to CA-MRSA genotypes. The PVL-positive spa types were t002, t008, t019, t044 and t068 ( Table 1) .
The CA-MRSA isolates were more frequently susceptible to erythromycin (P ¼ 0.004) and clindamycin (P ¼ 0.001) ( Table 2) . Twenty percent of the CA-MRSA genotypes and 38% of the HA-MRSA genotypes were resistant to more than two non-b-lactam antibiotics (P ¼0.169).
Fifteen index patients (13%) had community-associated genotypes, with t019 ST30 IV being the most common (n ¼6). Index patients with CA-MRSA were younger than index patients with HA-MRSA (mean age 49 versus 72 years, P ¼ 0.006). Furthermore, the length of hospital stay and the number of non-isolated days were shorter in index cases with CA-MRSA ( Table 2) . Eighty percent of the CA-MRSA strains were isolated from skin and soft tissue infections (SSTIs), as were 44% of the HA-MRSA isolates (Table 2) .
MRSA carriage was detected in 55 of 1108 (5%) persons screened during contact investigations. Three persons (two patients and one healthcare worker) had MRSA strains with different spa types than detected in the index patients and, thus, were not considered secondary cases. In 22 index patients, secondary cases were identified, with outbreak sizes ranging from 1 to 9 patients (excluding the index case, see Figure 1 ). The majority of outbreaks (12 of 22, 55%) consisted of one secondary case (Figure 1) . Assuming that every culture would detect MRSA in a colonized or infected patient, the upper limit for the MRSA detection rate is 21234/737 029 per patient day. Therefore, an index case will be detected as such every 33.6 days of colonization. The genotype-specific ratio between discharge and detection is 1.77, 11.19 and 1.60 for all genotypes, community-associated genotypes and hospital-associated genotypes, respectively.
The parameter for the geometric distribution, j, was 0.69 (95% CI 0.62 -0.76), 0.94 (95% CI 0.75-1.00) and 0.66 (95% CI 0.59-0.74) for all genotypes, CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA, respectively. There was no reason to reject the hypothesis of a geometrically distributed outbreak size for CA-MRSA (P ¼ 1). However, for hospital-associated strains the hypothesis of a geometrically distributed outbreak size was rejected (P ¼ 0.009).
Based on the genotype-specific discharge/detection ratios, R A values (i.e. the single admission transmissibility rates) were 0.07 (95% CI 0.00 -0.28) and 0.65 (95% CI 0.48-0.84) for CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA, respectively.
Discussion
Using the observational data of patients colonized with different genotypes of MRSA in four Danish hospitals, the results of subsequent contact investigations to determine MRSA transmission and a mathematical model, we conclude that CA-MRSA is 9.3 times less transmissible than HA-MRSA in Danish hospital settings. The R A values found are probably an overestimation of the actual risk of transmission, considering the fact that all cultures would not necessarily lead to the detection of an index case.
In this study we defined CA-MRSA based on combinations of genotypes, which are all known to cause infection in the community. It is becoming increasingly difficult to categorize CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA upon epidemiological criteria, such as duration of healthcare exposure. Since typical CA-MRSA strains may cause nosocomial infections 19, 20 and HA-MRSA genotypes may circulate in the community, such a definition will lead to misclassification. In fact, CA-MRSA isolates have already become the dominant isolates causing hospital infections in some regions. 6 The differentiation of MRSA isolates by one or multiple genotypic and phenotypic characteristics is, therefore, to be preferred. PFGE patterns, spa type, MLST, SCCmec type, presence of PVL and antibiotic susceptibility profiles have been used, alone or in combination, for this purpose. However, some features traditionally considered to be specific for CA-MRSA, e.g. SCCmec type IV, can also be found in successful hospital-associated isolates. 21, 22 Here, we use a combination of spa type and PVL to define community-associated genotypes. Isolates originating from the community could have been regarded as HA-MRSA; however, this would only dilute the increased transmissibility of HA-MRSA. Of the spa types considered to be community associated, only t008 had both PVL-positive and PVL-negative isolates, and only PVL-positive t008 isolates were considered community associated. Including the PVL-negative t008 isolates as community associated would further increase the differences in the R A values between HA-MRSA and CA-MRSA. The low number of index patients and, in particular, the low number of index patients with CA-MRSA isolates are a potential limitation to this study.
Our findings from the present study are comparable to the results of a recent study in which the transmissibility of livestockassociated MRSA was-using the same methods-compared with HA-MRSA strains in Dutch hospitals. 23 In both studies, the R A of HA-MRSA (and its 95% CI) was ,1, implying that a single admission of a patient colonized with MRSA is unlikely to initiate an epidemic, which confirms previous estimates of the R A of HA-MRSA. 24, 25 The comparability of the R A ratios of community genotypes found in Denmark and livestock genotypes found in the Netherlands is hard to determine. Probable dissimilarities in healthcare systems, nursing and ward protocols between countries are important factors that influence R A . As livestockassociated MRSA is rarely encountered in the Copenhagen area, we could not estimate the R A values of these strains in Danish hospitals. However, there is considerable genetic diversity of MRSA strains, including CA-MRSA, in the Copenhagen area, with the PVL-negative t024 ST8 IV strain being most prevalent. 26 This strain was responsible for multiple outbreaks in nursing homes during the study period and was introduced into the hospitals via the admission of long-term residents of these nursing homes. Since 2005, residents admitted from nursing homes with documented MRSA outbreaks have been considered at risk for MRSA and, therefore, are screened and subsequently isolated at hospital admission.
The recently reported successful emergence of CA-MRSA, USA300 in particular, in hospitals in the USA seems contradictory to the low transmissibility of CA-MRSA in Danish hospitals. Yet, the high transmissibility of USA300 in the community, especially among people with direct skin-to-skin contact, 27 may well have increased the introduction of CA-MRSA into hospitals. One could also speculate that an increase in MRSA colonization in healthcare workers could subsequently lead to an increase in transmission in hospitals. Importantly, frequent introductions of a pathogen with low transmissibility may still lead to patient-to-patient transmission. Furthermore, differences between US and Danish hospitals in general infection control practices and other variables influencing transmission from non-isolated patients (such as contact rates, and consequently staffing levels, beds per room, room sizes and patient turn-around time) will also influence the transmissibility of CA-MRSA. Finally, the characteristics of patients colonized or infected with CA-MRSA could be different between US and Danish hospitals, and this would also influence R A values.
For this model it is essential that outbreaks are rare and that rigorous screening occurs after the identification of an index case. If multiple outbreaks of the same genotype occur on the same ward the R A will be an overestimation, given the fact that all cases found after secondary screening will be attributed to the first index case. The 117 index cases found in four hospitals during 88 months of MRSA policy, is in line with this assumption. Furthermore, we have made some critical assumptions about heterogeneity. First, no distinction was made between healthcare workers and patients. Second, we assumed all carriers were equally infective and that all susceptible persons were equally at risk of becoming subsequently colonized. The consequences of these assumptions have been discussed in more detail elsewhere. 23 The difference in the R A values between CA-MRSA and HA-MRSA isolates could result from host factors, bacterial characteristics or a combination of both. The differences in patient age and length of hospital stay suggest that patients infected with or carrying CA-MRSA differ from those with HA-MRSA: index patients with CA-MRSA are younger and are discharged faster, which suggests that they are in a better health condition and is in accord with the general conception that CA-MRSA more frequently affects healthy individuals without previous healthcare exposure. Furthermore, more CA-MRSA infections were caused by SSTIs, which potentially accelerated the detection and implementation of isolation precautions. It is possible that these patients are less likely to spread MRSA and that those who share their hospital room are less susceptible to acquisition, due to differences in the severity of illness.
